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Member States Resistance to EU Foreign
Policy Sanctions
Clara PORTELA*
European Union (EU) sanctions are agreed in the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP), a framework where the unanimity rule prevails and where individual Member States
have a formal veto. Thus, Member State compliance with sanctions can be expected to be
optimal: If Member States have serious objections to the imposition of sanctions, they can veto
their adoption in the Council.Yet, while implementation is comparatively satisfactory, Member
States have availed of opportunities to undermine the application of EU sanctions regimes at
various levels. On the basis of the theoretical framework provided by Saurugger and Terpan, the
present article explores various ways in which Member States attempt to resist EU measures,
categorizes them and explains Member States’ choice of resistance techniques.
1 INTRODUCTION
One of the most important innovations brought about by the Maastricht Treaty of
1992 was the introduction of decision-making frameworks that go beyond the
supranational method characteristic of the European Community (EC).1 The
creation of the European Union (EU) entailed the establishment of two separate
intergovernmental frameworks for cooperation which were to co-exist with the
EC: the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home
Affairs (JHA).These forums were to deal with the external affairs (except for trade
and development cooperation) and with judicial and police cooperation
respectively. Contrary to the Community method, the intergovernmental pillars
generated legal acts which were binding upon the Member States but were not
subjected to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The
intergovernmental pillars represented an attempt to extend the benefits of
coordination among EC Member States without relinquishing sovereignty to the
supranational institutions. Decisions adopted under the CFSP and JHA were
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University.
The author thanks Prof Marise CREMONA and Dr Andres DELGADO CASTELEIRO for
comments on a previous version of this article and Mr Eugene TAN Jia Rong for diligent research
assistance.All errors are mine.
1 Throughout the text, when the term ‘Community’ is mentioned, reference is made to the period
before the Treaty of Lisbon.
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legally-binding, but they remained excluded from the jurisdiction of the ECJ,
although certain improvements to the judicial review of the legal acts were made
in subsequent treaty revisions.
Because these decision-making frameworks do not enact enforceable
legislation, Saurugger and Terpan argue in their introductory article that their
outcome can generate ‘soft law’. Snyder defines soft law as ‘rules of conduct which
in principle have no legally-binding force but which nevertheless may have
practical effects’.2 Thus, the concept of soft law can be applied to governance
arrangements that operate in place of, or along with, the ‘hard law’ arising from the
treaties and legislation. In the field of the CFSP, Saurugger and Terpan define soft
law in broader terms than those advanced by Snyder. They distinguish between
two types of soft law rules in the EU: binding rules that do not fall under the
control of the ECJ and non-coercive rules created under the so-called new modes
of governance, which define specific objectives and foresee mechanisms to frame
their implementation. 3
The development of soft law is accompanied by the emergence of resistance
to their consolidation.We speak of resistance to soft law whenever non-binding
rules (or binding rules with no mechanisms for enforcement or judicial review) are
breached. Resistance exerted by the Member States to the establishment and
consolidation of soft law norms constitutes the equivalent concept to
non-compliance with EC law that has been the subject of a voluminous body of
literature in European studies. As Saurugger and Terpan note, soft law norms,
although aimed at convincing Member States that convergence is possible without
major sovereignty losses, provoke as much resistance as hard law. Yet, this
phenomenon has remained unexplored so far, presumably due to the difficulty of
detecting the different manifestations of resistance.
The present article looks at resistance to soft law in the field of foreign policy
sanctions, a field that corresponds to the first type of Saurugger and Terpan’s
definition, namely binding rules adopted under the CFSP, a framework that long
escaped the scrutiny of the ECJ. Within the CFSP, sanctions acts arguably
constitute a borderline case. Sanctions practice transcends the CFSP framework,
affecting broader dimensions of EU governance. Firstly, as will be explained below,
the adoption of sanctions is the oldest cross-pillar mechanism, given that it
necessitates two legal acts of different nature. To the extent to which CFSP acts
give rise to the adoption of implementing regulations, they have a legislative
2 F. Snyder, Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the EC, in The Construction of Europe (ed. S. Martin,
Kluwer, 1994).
3 S. Saurugger & F.Terpan, Studying Resistance to EU norms in Foreign and Security Policy, introduction of
this special issue. For a definition of soft law in the European Union, see also F.Terpan, Soft Law in the
European Union,The Changing Nature of EU Law, 21 European Law Journal 1, 68–96 (2015).
EUROPEAN FOREIGNAFFAIRS REVIEW40
character. Notably, they sometimes prohibit companies from entering into
businesses with companies in the target state.4 Secondly, CFSP acts are subject to
judicial review by the ECJ, most explicitly after the Lisbon Treaty. Still, a number
of measures, namely those that emanate from a CFSP act but do not require an
implementing regulation because they do not fall within Community
competence, can be considered soft law as defined by Saurugger and Terpan.
EU sanctions are agreed in the CFSP, a context where decisions are taken by
unanimity and Member States have an individual formal veto. Thus, we should
expect optimal Member State compliance: If Member States had objections to the
imposition of a sanctions regime, they can wield their veto to prevent its adoption
in the CFSP Council or else use the threat of a veto to water-down its contents. In
fact, Member State compliance with sanctions agreed under the CFSP is
satisfactory. However, Member States have sometimes availed of opportunities to
undermine the application of EU sanctions regimes. On the basis of the theoretical
framework provided by Saurugger and Terpan, the present article explores the
various ways in which Member States attempt to resist EU-agreed sanctions
measures thereby undermining their application. In doing so, it classifies instances
of Member State resistance according to the basic categories of ‘contestation’,
‘circumvention’ and ‘diversion’. In a second step, the article tests the hypotheses
formulated by Saurugger and Terpan, in a bid to identify those factors that
account for resistance:The presence of mechanisms for punishing non-compliance,
the number of veto players, the financial and social resources of the transgressor,
and cognitive distance between the norms defined at EU level and those
formulated by the national administration.5 The main empirical focus is on the
first fifteen years that followed the creation of the CFSP, a formative period in the
evolution of EU foreign policy sanctions policy where notable transformations
took place which gave shape to later practice.
2 EU SANCTIONS:TYPES AND DECISION-MAKING
Sanctions are adopted in the intergovernmental CFSP. Once agreed, those
measures that have a bearing on the common market, i.e., economic and financial
restrictions, require the adoption of a regulation, which gives effect to the bans
reflected in the CFSP instrument (a ‘CFSP common position’ before the Lisbon
Treaty or ‘Council decision’ afterwards).This cross-pillar mechanism, known as the
4 P. Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations, 404 (Oxford
University Press, 2005).
5 Saurugger &Terpan, supra n. 3.
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‘two-step procedure’, emerges as a legal necessity: the imposition of sanctions is a
foreign policy matter that cannot be decided in the Community (ex-first pillar)
framework, thus requiring a previous intergovernmental decision. A regulation
agreed under Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) must follow the CFSP measure.
The two-step procedure entailing the obligatory adoption of two separate – albeit
connected – legal acts for the enactment of economic sanctions regimes took
shape during the 1970s. It thus constitutes a cross-pillar mechanism predating the
creation of the EU, formalized for the first time by the Maastricht Treaty.6
However, not all sanctions affect the common market. When the measures
agreed fall within the competence of the Member States, these are responsible for
implementation. This pertains to arms embargoes – since trade in weapons is
excluded from the common market – but also visa bans: two of the most
frequently used measures. In these instances, no implementing action by the EU is
required.
Finally, the suspension of agreements due to the activation of political
conditionality clauses can be considered a third type of sanctions on the grounds
that it meets definitional criteria: It entails the interruption of benefits
(development aid and trade preferences) that would otherwise be granted due to a
violation of political nature.7 The most notable example is the Partnership
Agreement between the EU and the African-Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states,
given that its conditionality provisions have given rise to a rich suspension
practice.8 The EU-ACP Agreement, routinely referred to as the ‘Cotonou
Agreement’, allows for its suspension in case of breach of democratic principles,
human rights or the rule of law, as enshrined in its Article 96. The fact that, for
several years, the Council decided on the interruption of aid in the CFSP context
testifies to the character of aid suspensions as a further type of sanction.9 In the
mid-1990s, competences were re-defined and aid suspensions were removed from
the CFSP framework. Suspensions are agreed by the Council of Ministers: partial
suspensions can be decided by QMV while full suspensions require unanimity.10
Thus, in the present article, three different types of EU sanctions with
different decision-making constellations are explored:
6 P. Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional Law:The Legal Regulation of Sanctions,
Exports of Dual-Use Goods and Armaments (Hart, 2001).
7 C. Portela,European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy (Routledge, 2010).
8 K. del Biondo, Aid conditionality in ACP Countries, 7 Journal of Contemporary European Research 3
(2011);A. Zimelis, Conditionality and the EU-ACP Partnership, 46 Australian Journal of Political Science
3 (2011).
9 U. Schmalz, Kohärenz der EU-Aussenbeziehungen? Der Dualismus von Gemeinschaft und gemeinsamer
Aussen-und Sicherheitspolitik in der Praxis,Working Paper, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (1997).
10 H. Hazelzet, Suspension of Development Aid Co-operation: An instrument to promote human rights and
democracy?, Discussion Paper No. 64B, ECDPM (Maastricht, 2005).
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Type of
Instrument
Entity in
Charge of
Decision
Imposition Act Entity Producing
Implementing
Legislation
Implementing
Act
CFSP sanctions
with economic
and financial
implications
Council CFSP Common
Position
(pre-Lisbon)
Council Decision
[post-Lisbon]
Community regulation
CFSP sanctions
without
economic and
financial
implications
Council CFSP Common
Position
[pre-Lisbon]
Council Decision
[post-Lisbon]
Not applicable;
implementation
by Member
States
none
Suspension of
EU-ACP
agreements
ACP
Council
ACP Council
decision
None none
Several legal bases exist for the adoption of sanctions. Prior to Lisbon,
sanctions were adopted on the basis of Article 301 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community (TEC), which enabled the EU to reduce economic
relations with third countries in implementation of CFSP acts. A specific
provision, Article 60 TEC, applied to measures affecting the movement of capital
and payments. However, for the adoption of blacklists of international terrorism
suspects, the Council had recourse to Article 308 as an additional legal basis.11 This
situation was corrected with the Lisbon Treaty, notably by introducing the notion
of sanctions against individual: It replaced Articles 301 and 60 TEC with Articles
215 and 75 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).12
The new provisions explicitly foresee the adoption of sanctions against natural or
legal persons and groups or non-State entities; Article 75 refers to measures on
capital and payments for the objective of fighting terrorism. Suspensions of aid to
ACP countries are decided by the ACP Council under Article 96 of the ACP-EU
Partnership Agreement.
11 A. Delgado Casteleiro, The implementation of targeted sanctions in the European Union, in Security Aspects in
EU External Policies, EUI LAW working paper 1 (ed.A. Delgado Casteleiro & M. Spernbauer, 2009).
12 Article 215 TFEU reads: ‘Where a decision, adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the
Treaty on European Union, provides for the interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of
economic and financial relations with one or more third countries, the Council, acting by a qualified
majority on a joint proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy and the Commission, shall adopt the necessary measures.’
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3 IDENTIFYING AND ACCOUNTING FOR RESISTANCE TO
SANCTIONS
The presence and shape of resistance by Member States can be detected by
examining the compatibility between national policies and European sanctions
adopted under different frameworks.This can be done against the background of
two overarching legal principles designed to ensure a good fit between EU soft
law rules and national policies outside the Community pillar.
Firstly, we consider the duty of sincere cooperation in EU external relations.
The obligations of Member States arising from this duty are stipulated as follows:
Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall,
in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties.
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the
institutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of
the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of
the Union’s objectives.
Secondly, there is the requirement of coherence in EU foreign policy. The
desire to achieve coherence in the external action of the EU goes back to the
Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, which enshrined the coherence requirement
for the first time.The Treaty on European Union (TEU) sets out the legal basis for
coherence in EU foreign policy. According to Article 3 TEU (pre-Lisbon), the
Union shall ensure consistency of its external activity and especially the
Commission and the Council ‘shall co-operate’ to this end. Article 13 TEU (now
Article 26 TEU post-Lisbon) stipulates that the Council ‘ensure[s] the unity,
consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union’. Coherence emerges as an
obligation for all actors in European foreign policy to coordinate their policies to
produce coherent outputs, thus holding together different policies whose
formulation corresponds to different actors and institutions within the EU.
Both principles have horizontal as well as vertical applications: The duty of
sincere cooperation explicitly applies to the institutions13, and as will be shown
later, specific provisions spell out the principle of coherence in development
cooperation, which gives it a vertical character.
If CFSP sanctions are adopted in an intergovernmental framework where
each Member State has a veto, why should we expect to find resistance to soft law
norms at all? The answer lies in the nature of collective sanctions. Because
sanctions operate by isolating the target, their imposition generates both economic
and political incentives for the senders to deviate.These incentives have been dealt
13 Article 13(2)TFEU.
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with extensively in the sanctions busting literature.14 Given that everybody else
has cut off links with the target, a third country that refrains from implementing
sanctions is able to benefit from the target’s dependence. Supplying a target with
goods unavailable elsewhere allows it to demand prices above market level and/or
demand concessions in other domains in exchange for its support. Maintaining
bilateral relations with an otherwise isolated target provides the sender with
considerable political leverage. In short, busting sanctions regimes is an easy way of
annihilating competitors, both in the economic and political arenas. Thus, states
have an incentive to first agree to the collective imposition of sanctions to bust
them once these are in place. On the other hand, peer pressure coupled with the
reputational costs associated with non-compliance militates against sanctions
busting and in favour of compliance.
The following section examines different instances in which Member States
have exerted resistance against sanctions, in an effort to unveil its manifestations. In
doing so, it classifies resistance according to the basic categories of ‘contestation’,
‘circumvention’ and ‘diversion’. ‘Contestation’ is expressed through the open
opposition to the existence of the norm and its application. ‘Circumvention’
techniques, by contrast, encompass the lack of usage of a norm, its replacement by
another one, or the continued use of a pre-existing diverging norm. Here,
opposition to the norm is less explicit. Finally, ‘diversion’ is defined as the
appropriation of the norm for a purpose different than the one originally
envisaged.15 The reminder of this exploratory study identifies scenarios of
resistance drawn from the EU’s experience with sanctions and checks the
explanatory power of the factors advanced by Saurugger and Terpan to account
for Member States’ resistance: The presence of punitive mechanisms for
non-compliance, the number of veto players, the resources of the transgressor, and
the misfit between EU norms and national norms.
4 RESISTANCE TO EU SANCTIONS: SCENARIOS
4.1 RESISTANCE TO FORMALIZATION AND PRESERVATION OF INFORMAL SANCTIONS
An easily identifiable instance of resistance is the lack of formalization of sanctions,
contrary to the ‘norm’ stemming from the Maastricht treaty, whereby sanctions
should be adopted formally.With ‘formalization’, it is meant that the decision to
impose sanctions is reflected in a legally-binding document. Prior to the
14 P. Andreas, Criminalising Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo busting and its consequences, International
Studies Quarterly 49, 365–360 (2005).
15 Saurugger &Terpan, supra n. 3.
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Maastricht Treaty, decisions on sanctions only found reflection in the text of
Council Conclusions or Presidency statements released after European Council
sessions. None of these documents have a legally binding character. Examples of
decisions pinned down in Presidency statements include the initial imposition of
sanctions on Burma/Myanmar following the lack of recognition by the military
junta of the victory of the National League for Democracy in the 1989 elections,
and the imposition of an arms embargo against China in response to the repression
of pro-democracy demonstrations inTiananmen Square in 1990.With the creation
of the CFSP in 1992, a number of legally binding instruments were established,
allowing the Council to formalize sanctions regimes. The instrument chosen to
give sanctions legal character was the CFSP common position. Hence, sanctions
regimes agreed after 1992 were adopted in the form of a common position,
which, as seen above, were followed by a regulation.Those few sanctions regimes
which had been originally adopted prior to 1992 were formalized into common
positions at a later stage. The sanctions regime against Burma/Myanmar was first
reflected in a common position in 1996. 16 By contrast, the China arms embargo
remains the only case of a sanctions regime which was never formalized into a
common position, while certain sanctions regimes – Russia and Cuba – were
agreed without being given a legally binding form. In the case of China, Russia
and Cuba, the norm consisting in formalizing sanctions has been opposed by some
Member States.
4.1[a] Lack of Formalization of the Arms Embargo against China
The imposition of sanctions by the EU was motivated by the repression of the
pro-democracy demonstrations that took place in Tiananmen Square in the spring
of 1989. The measures taken by the Council in June 1989 included an arms
embargo and interruption of military cooperation, but also the suspension of
bilateral ministerial and high-level contacts, the postponement of new projects, the
reduction of programmes of cultural, scientific and technical cooperation, the
prolongation of visas to the Chinese students in Europe and the postponement of
the examination of new requests of credit insurance.Yet, by October 1990, only
the arms embargo remained in place.17 The resilience of the arms embargo
regained attention after the European Council announced in December 2003 that
it was prepared to consider its lifting. However, these plans were frustrated by
opposition voiced by the European Parliament and above all, by the US Congress,
16 This circumstance led some observers to mistakenly believe that the sanctions originated in 1996.
17 G. Wacker, Ende des EU-Waffenembargos gegen China?, SWP Aktuell 13, (Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik, 2004).
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which passed a bill threatening to restrict military exports and technology-sharing
with those European countries that sold arms to China.18
The arms embargo on China remains the only EU sanctions regime which
has survived two decades after the introduction of the CFSP without having been
transformed into a common position. It is the only sanctions regime whose legal
basis remains a Presidency statement.The advantages of the lack of formalization
are manifold: While EU arms embargoes are routinely accompanied by an
interruption of military links, military cooperation between EU Member States
and China co-exists with the embargo. 19
On account of the lack of formalization of the embargo, individual Member
States remain responsible for its interpretation, in contrast to CFSP arms
embargoes, which include a detailed list of items covered. Because no common list
of goods covered under the embargo was agreed, Member States have more
leeway in deciding which items to supply. The China embargo led to a general
restraint among EU Member States to sign new contracts with China, but was not
interpreted as a ban on all European arms sales.20 The supply of equipment under
contracts concluded prior to 1990 continued. Some items with military
applications, such as early warning systems, were also supplied.The overall volume
of the sales remained relatively small; nevertheless, this resulted from US pressure
rather than from the China sanctions regime per se.
Even though Member States could expect some economic benefits in the
form of sales of equipment to China thanks to the informal nature of the
embargo, benefits of this nature are very modest.The lack of formalization results
from a balancing act between Europe’s allegiance to the transatlantic partner and
the overall economic and political gains to be derived from an emerging
powerhouse which, far from being marginalized, enjoys burgeoning relations with
the EU.
4.1[b] Imposition of Sanctions outside the CFSP: Cuba and Russia Sanctions
In contrast to the situation with the China embargo, the EU released a CFSP
common position on Cuba, and it agreed sanctions against the authorities in this
country. However, both remain disconnected as the sanctions do not feature in the
CFSP common position. Sanctions measures never found reflection outside a
18 Portela, supra n. 7.
19 N. Casarini,The International Politics of the Chinese Arms Embargo Issue, 42The International Spectator 3
(2007).
20 K. Osteneck, Die Umsetzung von UN-Wirtschaftssanktionen durch die Europäische Gemeinschaft, 168
Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht 1, 11 (2004).
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Presidency statement, even though they were agreed in 2003, i.e., at a time where
the common position was available as an instrument for sanctions imposition, and
despite the pre-existence of a common position devoted to democracy promotion
in Cuba.
The common position, first adopted in 1996 and renewed periodically since,
constitutes the basis for EU policy towards Cuba.21 In this document, the Council
acknowledges the steps towards economic opening undertaken by Cuba and sets
out a series of measures geared towards facilitating peaceful change, particularly
through the promotion of human rights. It foresees a gradual and conditional
strategy for the provision of support to Cuba: ‘As the Cuban authorities make
progress towards democracy, the EU will lend its support to that process and
examine the appropriate use of the means at its disposal for that purpose’. The
common position pursued both a political and a socio-economic objective: to
‘encourage a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable recovery and
improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people’.The EU explicitly ruled
out the use of economic coercion in order to achieve this objective: ‘It is not
European Union policy to try to bring about change by coercive measures with
the effect of increasing the economic hardship of the Cuban people’.
The imposition of diplomatic sanctions on Cuba took place in response to
the imprisonment of seventy-five political opponents in April 2003. The
crackdown on the opposition met with widespread international condemnation,
including that of its Latin American neighbours. The Council froze Cuba’s
application to accede to the Cotonou Treaty22 and decided to limit the bilateral
high-level governmental visits, reduce the profile of Member States’ participation
in cultural events, and to invite Cuban dissidents to national day celebrations
hosted at the embassies of EU Member States in Havana. The invitation of
dissidents to national day celebrations constituted the sanction that the Cuban
authorities resented most: In response, they froze diplomatic relations and
restricted cultural exchanges.23 Cuban official representatives ceased to attend
national festivities to which the dissidents were invited. Following the conditional
release of a number of the detainees in June and November 2004, the Council
suspended measures in early 2005, although it simultaneously announced that it
would intensify contacts with the political opposition and civil society in Cuba.
21 CFSP Common Position 96/697/CFSP, (2 Dec. 1996).
22 K. E. Smith, The Limits of Proactive Cosmopolitanism:The EU and Burma, Cuba and Zimbabwe, in The
European Union’s roles in International Politics. Concepts and Analysis, 160 (ed. O. Elgstöm & M. Smith,
Routledge, 2006).
23 Portela, supra n. 7.
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However, the Czech representative announced that his country would not respect
the decision to suspend the measures. As a result, the practice of inviting political
dissidents to receptions in Havana continued to be pursued by the embassies of
certain Member States, with which the Cuban authorities did not resume
contacts.
EU policies towards Cuba have been described as a ‘mixture of engagement
and light coercive measures’.24 In the light of the open display of resistance by the
Czech leadership, this mixture appears to result from the polarization between
Member States advocating engagement, led by Spain, and those in favour of
further isolation such as the Czech Republic. Sanctions were eventually lifted in
2008, in the context of the transfer of power from President Fidel Castro to his
brother Raul Castro.
4.1[c] ‘Pseudo-Sanctions’ against Russia
The EU first reacted to Russian human rights violations in Chechnya during the
crisis of 1995 by postponing the signature of the interim agreement that preceded
the implementation of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) of
1994. By the time Russian human rights violations perpetrated by Russian forces
in the second Chechen war were reported, the EU had several legal instruments in
place featuring human rights conditionality: Both the PCA and the TACIS
regulation featured suspension clauses that could be activated in response to severe
human rights breaches.25
The measures taken by the EU in response to the human rights violations
resulting from what the Council labelled ‘Russia’s disproportionate use of force’ in
Chechnya in late 1999 encompassed, among others, the transfer of some of the
funds granted under TACIS towards humanitarian assistance, and the limitation of
TACIS funds for the year 2000 to a areas such as human rights, rule of law, support
for civil society and nuclear safety.Yet, the Council refrained from activating the
human rights clause, and it eventually decided on milder measures in 2000,
including the suspension of the signature of the Scientific and Technological
Agreement, the Commission’s decision not to carry over unspent funds of food aid
from the 1999 to the 2000 budget, the prohibition to extend GSP privileges to
products not yet covered and the redirection of TACIS funds towards programmes
in support of humanitarian assistance, democracy and civil society.
The EU’s reaction to Russian behaviour in Chechnya shows that the Council
had several instruments at its disposal which it failed to use. The timidity of the
24 Smith, supra n. 22, 156.
25 E. Fierro,The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice (Martinus Nijhoff, 2003).
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EU’s reaction was denounced as a ‘subtile manière de donner l’impression de “faire
quelque chose” sans rien compromettre d’essentiel’.26
The Commission advocated the continued nurturing of the partnership
emerging between both actors. Commissioner Patten questioned the benefits of
suggested cut offs of financial assistance, expressing fears that it would ‘undermine
the pace of economic and social modernization’ and possibly ‘provoke a political
backlash against the international community in the run-up to the Duma elections
in December’.27 In sum, the enactment of more serious measures was dismissed
not only on grounds of the scarce prospects of ameliorating the situation in
Chechnya, but also out of fear of obstructing Russia’s democratic course.
Which sort of resistance?
The resistances shown by Member States in the lack of formalization fit squarely
in the category of ‘circumvention’, which refers to the lack of usage of a norm or
the continued use of a pre-existing diverging norm. The emerging norm of
formalizing sanctions in CFSP acts, followed not only in all new sanctions cases
throughout the 1990s such as Sudan, Indonesia, Belarus or Nigeria, but also in the
updating of the pre-Maastricht sanctions regime of Burma/Myanmar, was ignored
in the case of the China arms embargo. Here, the norm at stake was not the arms
embargo itself, but the emerging practice of adoption of CFSP acts to impose
sanctions. Because nothing in the CFSP prescribes the use of CFSP acts for the
imposition of sanctions, the adoption of this practice can be considered as a soft law
norm. The cases of Russia and Cuba are instances of continued use of a
pre-existing diverging norm.
The lack of formalization is symptomatic of a fragile consensus in the
Council. The weakness of the measures, compared to standard sanctions, was
mocked by observers, as ‘cocktail sanctions’ or ‘pseudo-sanctions’.28 The very label
of the measures was contested: Cuba has consistently referred to the measures as
sanctions, a term the EU side did not accept.29 In the China and Russia episodes,
the motivation for resistance resides in the importance of these countries, global
powers endowed with permanent seats at the UN Security Council and
26 T. de Wilde, Les mesures coercitives de l’UE à l’égard de l’URSS et de la Russie, in Les Relations entre
l’Union Européenne et la Fédération de Russie, 179 (ed.T. de Wilde & L. Spetschinsky, Institut d’Études
Européennes, 2000).
27 C. Patten,Declaration on Chechnya, speech/99/166 (European Parliament, Strasburg, 17 Nov. 1999).
28 P. N. Stangos, La conditionnalité politique, en termes de protection des droits de l’homme, de démocratie et d’état
de droit, des relations économiques extérieures de la Communauté de l’Union Européennes, in L’Effectivité des
Organisations Internationales: Mécanismes de Suivi et de Contrôle (ed. H. Ruiz-Fabri, L. A. Sicilianos &
J.-M. Sorel,A. Pedone, 2000); Portela, supra n. 7.
29 Portela, supra n. 7.
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top-trading partners of the EU.Hence, while public opinion and the EU’s declared
policy compelled the Council to react to severe human rights violations, the
Council was ultimately unwilling to follow up with measures that would
antagonize major powers and harm EU economic interests. Thus, the Council
undermined its initial decision announcing severe measures by eventually enacting
mellow measures.
The case of Cuba, by contrast, typically illustrates weak sanctions resulting
from disagreement among Council members. The open challenge to the
suspension of the cocktail sanctions by the Czech representative uncovers a
scenario different from the above: instead of Member States deviating from a
collectively agreed norm collectively, a Member State chose to depart from the
position agreed at the Council. Prague had failed to convince other Member
States that sanctions should be prolonged, and its opposition proved unsuccessful
again in 2008, when sanctions were eventually lifted.30 This act can be considered
as an instance of resistance on its own right, and can be catalogued as contestation
on account of its manifest nature. Ironically, the most obvious case of
circumvention – Cuba – does not represent an instance of lack of compliance, but
of Member State resistance to suspend measures, which contrasts with the
preceding examples.
4.2 DEFECTION AND ITS LEGALIZATION
Another form of Member States’ resistance to sanctions consists in deviating from
the norm at the national level, a situation which may result in the introduction of
a mechanism permitting defection ‘ex-post’ facto, i.e., after the deviation has
occurred.
The Zimbabwean crisis originated with the land reform that President
Mugabe launched in 2000, which entailed the expropriation of land from white
farmers and was accompanied by a wave of political violence. The refusal by
Zimbabwean authorities to allow EU electoral observers into the country on the
eve of the 2002 elections, and their harassment of the opposition, precipitated
CFSP sanctions. The EU imposed an arms embargo along with a visa ban and a
freezing of assets against President Mugabe, his government and his associates.The
EU’s ban on Mugabe’s participation in summit meetings provoked the cancellation
of the EU-African summit planned for 2003 and threatened to undermine
participation in that scheduled for 2007.
In defiance of the visa ban barely one-year after its imposition, France invited
President Mugabe to the Franco-African Summit which was to be held in Paris.
30 EU scraps political sanctions against Cuba, Euractiv, 20 Jun. 2008.
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While London reportedly disliked the idea, the Council decided to allow France
to make an exception to the visa ban on visits to member countries by President
Mugabe and other senior Zimbabwean officials. In return, Paris supported the
renewal of the sanctions regime. The justification put forward by the French
government was that other African participants had threatened to boycott the
meeting unless President Mugabe was allowed to attend. It also argued that the
summit constituted a chance to engage in dialogue with the Zimbabwean
president over the situation in his country.31
This incident prompted the Council to introduce a mechanism for the
granting of exceptions from the visa ban in the form of an additional clause.The
new clause, modelled on this incident, was henceforth inserted in all new common
positions restricting the admission of state leaders.The clause has been perfected to
stipulate conditions and set limits on the authorized travel. The current clause
reads:
Member States may grant exemptions from the measures imposed [visa ban] where travel
is justified . . . in exceptional cases on grounds of attending intergovernmental
meetings . . . where a political dialogue is conducted which directly, immediately and
significantly promotes democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe.32
The procedure for exceptions is detailed as follows:
Any Member State wishing to grant exemptions referred to in paragraph 5 shall notify the
Council in writing.The exemption shall be deemed to be granted unless one or more of
the members of the Council raise an objection in writing within 48 hours of receiving
notification of the proposed exemption. Should one or more of the members of the
Council raise an objection, the exemption shall not be granted, except where a Member
State wishes to grant it on urgent and imperative humanitarian grounds. In the latter
event, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to grant the proposed
exemption.33
France’s breach of the visa ban was thus given the character of a precedent.
The mechanism foreseen is fashioned in a way favourable to the transgressor: it
presumes the consent of other Member States, and the exemption is considered
granted unless any of them raises an objection within two days. Exemptions on
humanitarian grounds are particularly generous. Still, some boundaries are defined:
‘the authorisation shall be strictly limited to the purpose for which it is given and
to the persons directly concerned thereby’.34
31 Franco-African Summit opens under cloud, BBC, 20 Feb. 2003.
32 Council of the European Union, Council Decision concerning restrictive measures against Zimbabwe,
O.J.E.U, L42/6 (16 Feb. 2011).
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
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Which sort of resistance?
The resistance by the transgressor states can be described as contestation of the
norm. France was later followed by Italy, which allowed Mugabe’s attendance at
the funeral of Pope John Paul II in 2005, his beatification in 2011 and Pope
Francis’ inauguration in 2013. In each case, Mugabe was permitted to travel
through Italy to the Vatican, where the EU ban does not apply.The toleration of
breaches and their legalization by way of the introduction of a mechanism for
exemptions is a face-saving exercise: by allowing for deviations, the sanctions
regime was technically not breached even if its spirit was clearly violated.Yet, this
mechanism did not only make the original deviation legal, but created a
mechanism for granting further exemptions, thus permitting future deviations by
other members. From that point of view, the Council acted collectively to weaken
the norm it had established.
4.3 CHALLENGE TO AGREED SANCTIONS REGIMES
The third scenario presented is linked to the dual nature of the legal basis for the
imposition of sanctions. As explained above, two different legal documents,
adopted consecutively, are required for the imposition of sanctions: In a first step,
the political decision to impose sanctions is reflected in a CFSP act (a CFSP
common position before the Lisbon treaty or a decision since the Lisbon treaty),
detailing the nature and objectives of the agreed measures. This is followed by a
regulation whenever the sanctions agreed affected the competences of the
Community (before the Lisbon treaty) or the competences of the EU outside
CFSP (after the Lisbon treaty): a technical, implementing document containing
concrete stipulations to give effect to the sanctions. The adoption of a CFSP act
constitutes a legal requirement even in those cases in which the EU implements
sanctions mandated by the United Nations Security Council.
What have the Member States made out of this unusually complex legal
situation? We can identify different scenarios in which Member States have
exploited the two-step procedure to express different forms of resistance. When
examining the sanctions package imposed against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis of 1998/1999, Buchet de Neuilly found that
the Council agreed audacious measures in the framework of the CFSP. However,
these were watered down during the negotiation of the regulation. Member States
weakened the measures by virtue of the extended period of time they took to
agree on the regulation: time lags between the adoption of the CFSP common
position and the implementing regulations range from thirty-nine to seventy days,
allowing the Yugoslav federal government time to move its funds outside the EU
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before the regulation came into force.35 This situation is counter-intuitive given
that the CFSP common positions had been adopted unanimously, while the
implementing regulations only need majority consent. However, this scenario will
not be explored further given that the present discussion concerns only resistance
to sanctions after their adoption at the EU level. The practice of watering down
measures foreseen in the CFSP act during the negotiation of the regulation
subsided in the 2000s as the Council drafted increasingly detailed CFSP acts, thus
limiting the room to manoeuvre of the negotiators of the implementing
regulation.36
An instance of outright defiance of the sanctions can be identified:The UK
contested the applicability of the regulation banning Yugoslav commercial flights,
refusing to enforce it. British officials posited that existing air services agreements
concluded between the UK and Yugoslavia required a one-year notice before
denunciation could take effect. Thus, it claimed that it could not apply the
measures.
Which sort of resistance?
The refusal of the UK, a usually sanctions-friendly Member State, to apply the
flight ban appears as an instance of contestation. However, the phenomenon of
several Member States undermining measures they had previously agreed by
unanimity is not unequivocally understood as a deliberate attempt to resist CFSP
agreements. For Buchet, the misfit between Member States preferences in the
CFSP and EC Council results from the lack of coordination between
bureaucracies within national administrations. Delegates participating in CFSP
Council and EC meetings come from different sections of national
administrations. Hence, they negotiate sanctions regimes with different priorities
in mind: In the CFSP, political considerations are paramount, whereas economic
consequences are the principal concern for delegates in charge of in the external
economic relations. The first group regards the economic sanctions as a political
issue, bearing in mind their impact on the diplomatic arena, while in the second
group sanctions are negotiated as an economic issue, considering their impact on
trade and financial relations.37 Finally, the Kosovo sanctions constituted an atypical
sanctions package, where the EU wielded unusually far-reaching and sophisticated
measures, and which was to remain an isolated episode in subsequent EU sanctions
35 Y. Buchet de Neuilly, European Union’s External Relations Fields: the Multi-pillar Issue of Economic
Sanctions against Serbia, in Understanding the European Union’s external relations (ed. M. Knodt &
S. Princen, Routledge, 2003).
36 O. Poeschke,Maastrichts langer Schatten, 3 Hamburg Review of Social Sciences 1 (2008).
37 Buchet de Neuilly, supra n. 35.
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practice.38 The EU’s relative inexperience with autonomous flight bans, and with
CFSP sanctions in general, explains the legal difficulty encountered by the British
in the implementation phase. Indeed, it appears that the flight ban incident
occurred due to a failure to consult the legal services before the decision was
taken, a failure largely motivated by the consideration that CFSP sanctions were
primarily of a political nature. Because the contestation of the decision resulted
from an ex-post facto realization of the legal hurdles, it cannot be considered as an
instance of defiance on the side of the UK, otherwise one of the driving forces
behind the remarkably audacious sanctions effort in question. Instead, one is rather
inclined to lend credence of Buchet de Neuilly’s claim that the discrepancy
between the political framework of the CFSP Council and the more
technically-driven discussions over the regulation was responsible for this resistance
episode.
4.4 PROVISION OF BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT AID TO COUNTRIES UNDER EU SUSPENSION
To the general requirement of coherence discussed at the beginning of this article,
one should add a more specific provision in the field of development policy.
Indeed, ensuring some coherence between EU actions and the development
policies of the individual Member States has long been a concern for the EU.39
Because development policy is a field of shared competence, the exercise of this
competence by the EU does not prevent Member States from exercising theirs.40
The requirement of coherence in development cooperation is currently enshrined
in Article 208 of theTreaty (ex-177TEC): ‘The Union’s development cooperation
policy and that of the Member States complement and reinforce each other’.
Still, a misfit persists between political conditionality in national development
policies and the EU level. While the stipulations for political conditionality
between the EU and those of the UK tend to cohere, the development policies of
other Member States such as Italy and France do not contemplate conditionality
provisions in support of human rights, democracy and rule of law objectives.41 As
38 A. de Vries, European Union sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1998–2000): A special
exercise in targeting, in Smart sanctions: Targeting economic statecraft (ed. D. Cortright & G. A. Lopez,
Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); Portela, supra n. 7.
39 L. Laakso, T. Kivimäki & M. Seppänen, Evaluation of the consultation processes under article 96 in the
Cotonou Partnership Agreement (Albertslund, Conflict Transformation Service, 2006); C. Portela &
K.Raube,The EU Polity and Foreign Policy Coherence, 8 Journal of Contemporary European Research 1
(2012).
40 M. Bourriche, La cohérence de la politique européenne de coopération au développement, in Démocratie,
cohérence et transparence.Vers une constitutionnalisation de l’Union Européenne?, (ed. L. S. Rossi & M. Dony,
Presses de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2007).
41 D. De Felice, Diverging Views on Political Conditionality. The Role of Domestic Politics and International
Socialisation, 72 World Development (2015).
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a result from this discrepancy, development suspensions under Article 96 of the
Cotonou Convention are often unaccompanied by similar measures by the
Member States.
4.4[a] Central African Republic
The Central African Republic was one of the first ACP countries suspended under
the Cotonou agreement.The EU has a prominent role among donors, traditionally
providing the most of the multilateral aid received. Article 96 was invoked
following a coup d’état by General Bozizé in 2003.After a monitoring mission in
October 2003, the Council decided on a partial suspension of development
cooperation encompassing some road projects, macro-economic support, and a
progressive reduction of the 9th EDF funds. Cooperation was resumed following
the presidential and legislative elections in 2005.
The following table indicates the amount of aid disbursed by three main
donors, the UK, France and the European Commission, prior to the decision on
suspension in 2003 and after the reinstatement of 2005:
Table 1 Aid Provided to Central African Republic by the EC, UK and France
Donor 2003
(Before
Suspension)
2004
(Suspension in
Force)
2006
(After
Reinstatement)
2007
EU 74.89 6.31 100.35 50
UK ... ... 0.92 3.77
France 33.75 37.10 41.02 49.83
Source: OECD statistics (figures in USD million).
The table shows that, while there is a clear drop in the funds received by
CAR from the EC the year after the suspension was decided, i.e., the first year
where the suspension was effective (2004), a considerable increase followed its
revocation in 2005. In the case of the UK, some limited allocation of funds came
about only after the restoration of democratic rule in the form of elections. By
contrast, the French allocation increased after the suspension.
4.4[b] Côte d’Ivoire
The military coup in Abidjan of December 1999 provoked widespread
international condemnation, and compelled the EU to refrain from new financial
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commitments for Côte d’Ivoire other than humanitarian projects of direct benefit
to the poorest sections of the population. In February 2000, Ivorian authorities
committed to a timetable to hold elections, adopt a constitution, and guarantee the
separation of powers, free press and transparency. Satisfied with these
commitments, the EU agreed on a package of measures to support the transition
to democracy. Existing cooperation was not altered, but it was decided that the
programmes for which financial agreements had not yet been signed would be
subject to a ‘gradual and conditional’ approach. Following the flawed presidential
and legislative elections in the same year, the EU decided to take a ‘gradual and
conditional approach’ again towards the implementation of new projects in
support of the restoration of democracy, rule of law and good governance.
Cooperation was fully resumed in January 2002 in view of satisfactory progress by
the Ivorian government.
With the intensification of fighting in the country in 2002, the EU
relinquished the management of the crisis to the UNSC, which imposed
mandatory sanctions featuring an arms embargo, a visa ban and freezing of assets
along with a ban on the import of diamonds.42
Table 2 Aid Provided to Côte d’Ivoire by the EC and France
Donor 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
EC 45.24 91.34 50.91 12.79 30 48.69 51.42 57.78
France 481.45 304.78 162.56 138.29 752.76 194.4 126.78 96.65
Source: OECD statistics (figures in USD million).
The overall figures show that, contrary to the situation witnessed with the
Central African Republic, France is a far more important donor than the EC. In
the period from the decision to adopt the partial suspension in 1999, we observe
low levels of EC aid. By contrast, France maintained high levels of aid, with a
significant peak in 2002.
The peak observable in French aid to Côte d’Ivoire while the EU had
reduced aid and following a strategy of mild, progressive increase is also visible in
statistics showing the percentage of French aid dedicated to Côte d’Ivoire,
measured as a percentage of the GDP. This shows that the increase in 2002 was
considerable not only in absolute, but also relative terms.
42 Security Council, Resolution 1572, S/RES/2004 (15 Nov. 2004) and, Resolution 1643, S/1643/2005
(15 Dec. 2005).
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Table 3 French Aid Provided to Côte d’Ivoire as a Percentage of the GDP
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
3.8% 7.6% 3.6% 3.4% 1.6% 9.3% 1.8% 1.0% 0.7%
Source: OECD statistics.
It is unclear whether the steep surge in French aid of 2002 was motivated by a
desire to reward or incentivize progress by the Ivorian authorities, or whether it
was a deliberate attempt to increase French leverage with their former colony.
Whatever the case, the surge was out of step with the gradual and conditional
approach engineered by the Commission to reinstate aid progressively to Abidjan.
Which sort of resistance?
Member State resistance to the requirement of coherence in development during
the period of suspension can be characterized as circumvention.There is no open
contestation of the norm, but the practice does not reflect a desire to coordinate
action with the EU.A lack of usage of the norm is observed.While development
policies of the Union and the Member States are supposed to be complementary,
practice shows that some Member States have a preference for ‘renationalizing’
their bilateral aid rather than aligning themselves with that administered by the
Commission.43 Prior to the Maastricht treaty, the Commission had been able to
suspend development cooperation without seeking approval from the Council.44
After Maastricht, the CFSP Council moved to cut off aid as part of its sanctions
packages, a practice which was resisted by the Commission.45 The compromise
found consisted in removing aid suspensions from the realm of the CFSP, and
allowing the ACP Council to decide on suspensions, which should be monitored
and managed by the Commission.46 Resistance to cohere with EC policies can be
regarded as challenging that compromise.This resistance can be seen in the light of
the communitarization of EU development cooperation undertaken with the
Maastricht treaty, which endowed the Commission with considerable autonomy in
the management of aid while it introduced QMV at the Council in this field.47
Against this background,Member States’ motive might be to hinder the role of the
EU in sensitive situations such as democratic backsliding, taking this matter back
43 Bourriche, supra n. 40.
44 Fierro, supra n. 25.
45 G. Dusépulchre, Dimension politique de la politique européenne de coopération au développement, quelle
cohérence ?, in Rossi & Dony (eds), supra n. 40.
46 Schmalz, supra n. 9.
47 Bourriche, supra n. 40.
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to the realm of national foreign policy, in particular, when relations with former
colonies of marked economic importance such as Côte d’Ivoire are affected.
5 WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR RESISTANCE?
In a bid to identify those factors that account for resistance, Saurugger and Terpan
had singled out four explanatory factors: The presence of mechanisms for
punishing non-compliance, the number of veto players, the financial and social
resources of the transgressor, and cognitive distance between the norms defined at
EU level and those defined by the national administration.48 Accordingly, the
following hypotheses were formulated:
H1: The stronger the punishment for non-compliance, the higher the
probability of Member States’ compliance.49
H2: The higher the number of veto players, the higher the probability that
resistance occurs.
H3:The higher an actors’ financial and social resources, the higher its capacity
to resist policy implementation.
H4:The higher the cognitive distance between the norms defined at EU level
and those defined by the national administration, the higher the probability that
national actors will resist the implementation of the European norm.
In the cases studied in this article, no penalties were associated with
non-compliance with foreign policy sanctions decisions. Social sanctions in terms
of reputational costs may be high:The media often point at national governments
when realpolitik prevails over human rights promotion. As compliance with the
implementation of agreed sanctions is largely satisfactory despite the absence of
penalties, the analysis disconfirms the first hypothesis. Considering the volume of
sanctions imposed during the past twenty-five years, the identified resistance
attempts are rare.While the brief analysis does not claim to encompass the entire
universe of resistance, it is difficult to believe that obvious deviations could have
escaped public attention. Overall, the good level of compliance observed suggests
that Member States have been socialized into complying with agreed sanctions.
The unanimity requirement in the Council seems to ensure that outcomes
undesired by individual Member States are prevented from materializing in CFSP
acts in the first place. The second hypothesis is equally invalid. In the CFSP
Council, the number of veto players reaches its maximum: there is one per
Member State.Yet, the high number of veto players in the CFSP Council – one
per Member State – contrast with the low incidence of resistance. Indeed, the
48 Saurugger &Terpan, supra n. 3.
49 While the original formulation reads ‘sanctions’ instead of ‘punishment’, the wording has been
modified in order to avoid confusion with the subject matter of the present article.
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scenarios of resistance identified cannot be accounted for by the presence of a
higher number of veto players than elsewhere.
The third and the fourth hypotheses seem to hold the most explanatory
power. We find that transgressors are often wealthy, large Member States with
powerful bureaucracies. By contrast, resistance exhibited by small Member States
such as the Czech Republic is rare. France emerges as the most prominent
transgressor in our exploration, particularly in its African policy. A Member State
with an active foreign policy, it is ready to contradict EU sanctions in order to
maintain its influence south of the Sahara. Only wealthy Member States with a
large development budget can afford to increase its foreign assistance to offset an
EU aid suspension; and possibly only a major European power would find the
confidence to challenge repeatedly EU foreign policy decisions without fearing
political isolation. Finally, the hypothesis positing that the misfit between the soft
law norm and the Member State’s orientation is relevant in explaining French
resistance.The sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire and Central African
Republic were justified by democratic backsliding and human rights violations.
Among Western donors, French development policy stands out as particularly
inattentive to the state of democracy of the beneficiary.50 The misfit between the
development policy orientation of France and the Nordic-inspired approach to
politically condition foreign aid, accepted at EU level but hardly internalized by
Paris51 , appear to be at the root of much of its resistance to sanctions. In sum, our
analysis suggests that France resists because of its high resources coupled with the
cognitive distance between EU norms and its national foreign policy machinery.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Our cursory exploration of EU sanctions record reveals a varied practice of
resistance by Member States in the post-Maastricht period. Resistance to the
formation or consolidation of soft norms was almost invariably intentional and
unrelated to the weakness of administrative capacity that has sometimes been made
responsible for non-compliance in the Europeanization literature.
Our sample also reveals a predominance of circumvention over other types of
resistance. Instances of diversion are less frequent, while open contestation or
outright defection from agreed regimes remains rare. This circumstance unveils a
desire to maintain some appearance of the EU as a unified foreign policy actor.
Member States prefer to resist by circumvention rather than openly challenging
EU decisions on political grounds. This technique might be preferred because,
50 A.Alesina & D. Dollar, Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?, 5 Journal of Economic Growth, 33–63
(2000).
51 De Felice, supra n. 41.
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beyond punctual disagreements with specific decisions, Member States ultimately
acknowledge an interest in keeping the CFSP in place, a structure vulnerable to
outright political defiance.
At the onset of our article, we enquired whether the hypothesis that defection
is motivated by the expectation of benefits from an isolated target – a hypothesis
from the sanctions busting literature – applies to the experience of national
resistances to EU sanctions. Some evidence in support of this hypothesis is found:
Certainly, France’s resistance to EU sanctions on Africa appears largely rooted in its
desire to maintain political influence in the region. However, it does not tell the
whole story of resistance to EU sanctions.The lack of formalization of sanctions
regimes is due to a reluctance to antagonize important partners. The Czech
challenge to the suspension of the Cuban sanctions had more to do with the
ambition of strengthening relations with the hawkish US government under
George W. Bush. The weight of economic motivations appears to be marginal.
Then again, the fact that sanctions busting in pursuance of commercial advantages,
a routine scenario elsewhere, is hardly observable with EU sanctions is
unsurprising considering that its measures, in most of the EU’s history and
certainly in the period under study here, displayed minimal economic disutility for
the European economy.
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